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, CONGLOMERATES, CONGLOMERATE
MERGERS AND THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS
JOHN T. MILLER, JR.*
The Supreme Court stated in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. (Clorox),
that conglomerate mergers are "within the reach" of section 7 of the Clayton
Act 2 and are to be tested by the same standard applied to all types of
mergers under this federal antitrust law. A "pure conglomerate merger" was
,defined as "one in which there are no economic relationships between the
acquiring and acquired firm." 3 While the Court's statement was dictum, 4 it
provides some guidance. Why then do we find contradictory anxieties? The
Staff of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability reported in January 1969
that the Clayton Act appears "inadequate to cope with the massive in-
dustrial restructuring resulting from current conglomerate merger activity."5
On the other hand, the President's Task Force on Productivity and Competi-
tion, alarmed at the effectiveness with which the present antitrust laws could
be enforced against mergers of large companies, advised in 1969 that
"[v]igorous action [against conglomerate mergers] on the basis of our present
knowledge is not defensible." 6
Several factors contribute to this contrasting reaction. Although its use
is significantly on the rise, the conglomerate merger is a rather unfamiliar
* Member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars. Adjunct Professor of
Law, Georgetown Law Center. A.B., Clark University, 1944; J.D., Georgetown University,
1948; Docteur en Droit, University of Geneva, Switzerland, 1951.
1386 U.S. 568 (1967).
2 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
3 386 U.S. at 577 & n.2. Unless otherwise indicated, this article employs the classifica-
tions of mergers utilized by the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission
in its statistical reports on mergers. The Bureau places each acquisition in the classifica-
tion which it judges economically most significant, even though an acquisition may
involve more than one relationship. A merger is horizontal when the companies involved
produce one or more of the same, or closely related, products in the same geographic
market. A merger is vertical when the two companies involved had a buyer-seller relation-
ship prior to the merger. Conglomerate mergers are classified into three subcategories. A
product extension merger is one where the acquiring and acquired companies are func-
tionally related in production and/or distribution but sell products which do not com-
pete directly with one another. A market extension merger is one where the acquiring
and acquired companies manufacture the same products, but sell them in different
geographic markets. The category of other conglomerates involves the consolidation of
two essentially unrelated firms. See BuREAu OF ECONOMICS, FTC, STAT. REP. No. 4, LARGE
MERGERS IN MANUFACTURING AND MINING 1948-1968, at 4-5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
STAT. REp. No. 4].
4 The Court chose to treat the matter before it as "a product extension" merger
not falling within the usual categories of horizontal, vertical or conglomerate.
5STAFF OF CABINET COMM. ON PRICE STABILITY, STUDIES 86 (Jan. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as CABINET STUDY].
61969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION, 115
CONG. Rac. 6472, 6476 (daily ed. June 16, 1969) [hereinafter cited as STIGLER TASK FORCE
REPORT].
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phenomenon. Economists have not yet been very successful in evaluating the
the possible impact of a conglomerate merger either in an individual case
or in terms of the effect of the conglomerate development on the overall
economy.7 And, succeeding Assistant Attorney Generals in charge of the
Antitrust Division have held contrary views as to the applicability of the
Clayton Act to pure conglomerate mergers. s
The fundamental question is whether the federal antitrust laws will
prove to be reliable instruments for preserving a competitive economy in
the face of a merger movement quite different in character than the one
which Congress examined when it last legislated in the area in 1950. It
looks as though the present conglomerate movement will require vigorous,
ground-breaking applications of the antitrust laws. If the long reach of law-
enforcement history is examined, apprehensions concerning the future are
warranted. The antitrust laws failed signally to play an effective part at
critical times during the first two merger movements experienced after the
Sherman Antitrust Act became law in 1890.9 The Attorney General, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Supreme Court and Congress must
share the blame for those failures. Yet, if the student regards the high de-
gree of success which the Government has enjoyed in merger cases before
the Supreme Court over the past 10 years, 1° he has reason to be optimistic,
provided the Attorney General seeks vigorously and imaginatively to reg-
ulate the merger movement. It is this possibility that apparently alarmed
the Presidential Task Force in 1969.
In the short space allowed for this essay, I propose to examine some
aspects of the conglomerate merger development which warrant a vigorous
antitrust enforcement by the Government, and to express a few critical views
of current developments.
THE CONGLOMERATE PHENOMENON
The economy is currently in the course of the third and, by far, the
longest of the three major merger movements which have occurred since
7 Potentially anticompetitive mergers may be allowed to proceed because eco-
nomic theory and analytical foresight are inadequate to predict anticompetitive
effects in specific cases, even though there may be good reason for believing that
some classes of mergers, considered in the aggregate, are harmful to competition.
1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY, 115 CONG. REc. 5642, 5646
(daily ed. May 27, 1969) [hereinafter cited as NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT].
8 The present Assistant Attorney General is of the opinion that the law is applicable.
McLaren, Mergers, Acquisitions and Joint Ventures, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50, 244 (1969).
His predecessor did not believe the present law reached the purer forms of conglomerate
mergers. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L.
REV. 1313, 1393-95 (1965).
9 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
The peak years of the first movement were 1898 through 1902. The second took place in
the years 1926 through 1930. The third began in 1943 and has continued down to the
present time. STAFF REPORT OF SELECT HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 87TH CONG.,
2D SESS., MERGERS AND SUPERCONCENTRATION: ACQUISITION OF 500 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL AND
50 LARGEST MERCHANDISING FIRMS 9-12 (Comm. Print 1962).
10 See Solomon, Why Uncle Sam Can't Lose a Case Under Section 7 of the Claylto,
Act, 53 A.B.A.J. 137 (1967).
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1890. It began rather modestly during World War II, became more active
during the 1950's and early 1960's, and accelerated rapidly during 1967, 1968
and early 1969. The Staff of the Federal Trade Commission reported a total
of 4,003 mergers in 1968, an increase of 68 percent over 1967.11 Acquisitions
of manufacturing and mining firms in 1968 were over 11 times as numerous
as those in 1950, and almost 60 times larger in terms of assets acquired. 12
There are several features of this development, in addition to its vigor,
which justify a re-examination of federal antitrust policy: the increased use
of conglomerate mergers; the activities of the large conglomerates; the rise
in aggregate concentration (the share of all manufacturing held by the
largest firms); and the disappearance of sizeable firms as independent entities.
A. Increased Use of Conglomerate Mergers
The hallmark of the current movement, apart from its length and size,
is its conglomerate character. Conglomerate acquisitions accounted for over
$11 billion of the $12.6 billion of assets acquired through large acquisitions
of manufacturing and mining firms in 1968.1-3 They accounted for 84 percent
of the number and 89 percent of the assets of all such acquisitions recorded
for that year.14 Between 1964 and 1968, the number of large conglomerate
acquisitions in manufacturing and mining rose from 62 to 161 per annum,
an increase of over 150 percent, while the average asset size of the firms
acquired increased from $29 million to $68.5 million.15
B. Activities of the Large Conglomerates
A striking phenomenon of the times and one which has aroused both
interest and apprehension on the part of investors as well as commentators on
the state of the economy, is the rise of the "conglomerate" firm, an enter-
prise engaged in a number of industrial activities serving more or less
distinctive markets. Eleven of the 25 firms which had been the most active
acquirers since 1960 were classified in a 1969 FTC Staff Study as new
conglomerates.16 "Twenty years ago, most of them were not in existence,
were unheard of, were very little heard of, or were practically single product
firms."'" Their merger activities are impressive. As a group, they acquired
almost 500 firms with total assets amounting to some $12 billion from 1961
through 1968. Eighty percent of this total amount is accounted for by
slightly over 40 acquisitions involving firms with assets of $50 million or
more.'8
11 BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC. STAT. REP. No. 3, CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER Ac-
TIVITY, 1968, at 1, 8 (1969) [hereinafter cited as STAT. REP. No. 3].
12 BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS, App. Table
1-3, at 667 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT].
13 STAT. REP. No. 3 at Table 11.
14 Id. at Table 10.
15 Id. at Table 11.
16FTC REPORT at 268, 269.
17 Id. at 268-69.
18 Id. at 276.
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C. Rise in Aggregate Concentration
The largest companies in the country, as a group, have been the most
active acquirers of other firms since World War II. Companies with asset
size of $250 million or more acquired 37 percent of the firms and 56.3
percent of all assets acquired between 1948 and 1968. Companies with asset
size between $100 and $250 million acquired 24 percent by number and
21 percent of the assets over the same period.19 The 200 largest corporations
expanded greatly the number of industries in which they participate.2 0 The
largest firms have become more powerful as economic entities in the process.
It has been estimated that by 1967 the hundred largest corporations held the
same share of manufacturing assets as the 200 largest held in 1948.21
D. Disappearance of Sizeable Firms as Independent Entities
Since World War II, mergers have taken a heavy toll of the medium-
sized companies, the very companies with the greatest capacity to compete
with the largest 200 firms. During the years 1948 through 1968, there were
1,282 acquisitions of large manufacturing and mining firms with assets
totaling over $52 billion. Conglomerate mergers account for 72.7 percent
of these acquisitions. 22 It has been estimated that if firms with assets in excess
of $10 million had not been acquired by mergers over the past 20 years,
there would have been at least 50 percent more companies with assets of
$10 million or more operating as independent businesses in 1969,28 firms
most likely to provide competition for the largest corporations.
The conglomerate merger development has not been monolithic. No
two mergers are ever quite alike. Many have been mixed, with vertical or
horizontal as well as conglomerate aspects. In the case of conglomerate
mergers, there has been an evolution over the past few years in the nature
of the acquisition actually made. Product extension mergers accounted for
over 90 percent of conglomerate mergers (in terms of assets) in 1964, but less
than 45 percent of such mergers in 1968.24 Market extension mergers were of
little importance in either year. The remarkable evolution has occurred in
the "other conglomerate" classification which accounted for about 5 percent
of the large conglomerate acquisitions in 1964. Four years later, 49 percent
of the large conglomerate and 43 percent of all large acquisitions were
classified as "other conglomerate. '25 This last development represents a rapid
exploitation of what businessmen have been advised is a regulatory gap in
19 Id. at 36.
20 CABINET STUDY at 81.
21 Id. at 82.
22 STAT. REP. No. 4 at Table 2.
28 FTC REPORT at 47.
24 In terms of assets, conglomerate acquisitions totalled $1.7 billion in 1964 as
against $11.1 billion in 1968. STAT. REP. No. 3 at Table 11.
25Id. at Tables 10 & 11.
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the antitrust laws, a state of mind encouraged in some respects down to the
present time by the Federal Trade Commission.26
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: UNCERTAIN MOLDERS OF CHANGE
We are concerned with two statutes: the Sherman Act of 189027 and
section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914, as amended in 1950 by the Celler-
Kefauver Act. 28
A. The Sherman Act
I Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes agreements, combinations and
conspiracies which restrain interstate and foreign commerce unlawful. Under
section 2 of the Act monopolization and attempts to monopolize any part
of interstate or foreign commerce are unlawful. The Act was intended to com-
bat the "trusts" which, through acquisitions and predatory practices, had
achieved such dominant positions in the economy that they were beyond
the capacity of state governments 29 to regulate under the common law.30
Chief Justice Hughes referred to the Sherman Act in 1933 as "a charter
of freedom" with "a generality and adaptability comparable to that found
to be desirable in constitutional provisions."3 1 Had the Supreme Court taken
a similar view of the Act when dealing with the sugar "trust" in 1895, the
statute might have played a significant role in the merger movement which
reached its peak between 1898 and 1902. Instead, the American Sugar
Refining Company was allowed to increase its control of sugar refining in
the United States from 65 percent to 98 percent through acquisition of
three independent refiners, the Supreme Court holding in United States v.
E. C. Knight Co. 3 2 that the Sherman Act was inapplicable because the
mergers involved production and manufacturing rather than commerce.
Many important mergers in American industrial history occurred during
the paralysis of law enforcement which followed the Knight decision. Some
26 For example, the failure of the Federal Trade Commission to endorse positively
the FTC Report prepared by its Staff and submitted to Congress in the fall of 1969.
27 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1964).
2SAct of October 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 780, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1964); Act of December 19, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
29The states found that they could not regulate the anticompetitive activities of
the corporations which they had chartered, after such corporations became very large.
When challenged under state law, management could simply transfer control activities to
another corporation chartered in a friendly state.
a0 Monopolies and other restraints of trade were regulated under the common law.
The Sherman Act was the result of a conclusion that there was no federal common law.
The assistance of the federal courts in combatting the trusts could be assured only by
grant of specific statutory power. However, Congress declined to define the key terms
"restraint of trade," "monopolize" and "attempts to monopolize," leaving that function to
the courts, which provided content by drawing upon the resources of American and
English decisions under the common law. Professor Milton Handler has perceptively ob-
served: "The Sherman Law gave birth to no new principle." M. HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN
PERSPECTIVE 3 (1957).
aiAppalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
82 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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26 corporations controlled 80 percent or more of the production in their
respective fields before the wave of consolidation subsided.33 The stock
market slump of 1903-1904 and the exhaustion of the supply of apt merger
candidates are credited as principal factors in halting the merger movement,
although an attempt had been made to revitalize the Sherman Act in 1903
by legislation.3 4 President Theodore Roosevelt's decision to challenge corpo-
rate mergers despite the holding in Knight led to the Supreme Court
decision in 1904 that the merger of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern
Railroads was in violation of the Sherman Act.3 5 The Court further re-
deemed a little of its Sherman Act paralysis by approving in 191136 the
dissolution of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco trusts which had
grown substantially in the shelter of Knight. But in the process, the Court
added a gloss to the text of the Sherman Act which disabled it as a reliable
tool for regulating mergers in the future. The Court held that agreements,
combinations and conspiracies restraining trade were illegal under section 1
of the Sherman Act only if "unreasonable." This "rule of reason" thrust
upon the Government an unmanageable burden of proof. The evisceration
of the Act as an antimerger statute is highlighted by two decisions favorable
to United States Steel Corporation, which had been organized in 1901 and
built up by the acquisition of some 180 firms. In 1920 the Supreme Court
held that the Sherman Act was not violated by mere size or by unexerted
power. The fact that the Steel Company was large constituted no violation
of the statute.
[T]he law does not make mere size an offense or the existence of un-
exerted power an offense. It, we repeat, requires overt acts and trusts to
its prohibition of them .... It does not compel competition nor require
all that is possible .... We have seen whatever there was of wrong intent
could not be executed, whatever there was of evil effect, was discontinued
before this suit was brought; and this, we think, determines the decree.37
The Government failed again in 1948 to revive the Sherman Act as a
device to check anticompetitive mergers when the Supreme Court held that
the record would not support a conclusion that the acquisition by the
United States Steel Corporation of the assets of the largest independent steel
fabricator on the west coast unreasonably lessened competition or consti-
tuted an attempt to monopolize.
33 FTC, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A
SUMMARY REPORT 23-24 (1948).
34 MUELLER, THE CELLER-KEFAUVER ACT: 16 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT, STAFF REP. TO
ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The
Antitrust Division was organized in the Department of Justice in 1903. The Expediting
Act, which became law in the same year, promised quicker review of government anti-
trust suits by the Supreme Court.
35Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
36Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
37 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451-52 (1920).
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In determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint ... we look rather
to the percentage of business controlled, the strength of the remaining
competition, whether the action springs from business requirements or
purpose to monopolize, the probable development of the industry, con-
sumer demands, and other characteristics of the market. 38
B. The Clayton Act
With the encouragement of President Wilson, Congress sought to
remedy the harm done by the "rule of reason." The Clayton Act, which
became law in 1914, listed several practices, including mergers, which could
be enjoined where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly. The newly-organized Federal Trade Commission
shared with the Attorney General the responsibility for enforcement. Private
suits were to be a helpful adjunct.
Section 7 of the new Act applied to mergers effected through the
acquisition of stock; it did not apply to assets acquisition. Businessmen
exploited the gap. Where a merger of competitors effected by a stock
acquisition was attacked by the Government, the Supreme Court held that
the merger of assets prior to agency action and decision, 39 or the dissolution
of a holding company (which had acquired the stock of competing firms) and
distribution of unlawfully acquired shares to its shareholders or to other
corporations after a Commission complaint had been issued,40 deprived the
FTC of jurisdiction. Were this not enough, no attempt was made to enforce
section 7 against vertical mergers because of the opinion of the enforcement
authorities that the statute applied only to horizontal mergers.41
Disabled by an inadequate statutory text, hampered by unhelpful Court
decisions and hamstrung by inadequate enforcement personnel and an
erroneous interpretation of the law, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act
had little impact on the second major merger movement which occurred
between 1925 and 1930, when many large combinations in manufacturing
and mining were organized. This period also saw the rise in size and
influence of the public utility holding company and the beginnings of public
discontent with their shortcomings. It subsequently required remedial legisla-
tion, as well as years of administrative proceedings and court suits, to
resolve the holding company problem.
The federal antitrust laws proved ineffectual when called upon in the
1940's to cope with the present merger movement, as was seen in United
States v. Columbia Steel Co.4 Congress sought to remedy the situation in
88 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948). The Sherman Act
was the basis of the suit, rather than section 7 of the Clayton Act, because the latter
statute did not apply at that time to assets acquisitions.
89 See Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
4 0 Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
41 This view was held to be erroneous in United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
42 334 U.S. 495 (1948); see note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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1950 by enactment of the Celler-Kefauver Act amending section 7 of the
Clayton Act. The new text applied to acquisitions of assets as well as stock,
while the market effects criteria was broadened to apply "to all types of
mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal,
which would have the specified effects of substantially lessening competition
... or tending to create a monopoly. '43
The new statute was vigorously applied by the enforcement authorities
and liberally interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Government challenged
over 800 mergers between 1950 and 1966, including about 10 percent of all
large mergers in manufacturing and mining. Few mergers among small
manufacturing and mining corporations were attacked. Over half the chal-
lenged mergers involved horizontal relationships, 26 percent involved vertical
relationships and 22 percent involved conglomerates. Among the conglomer-
ates, the Government challenged 19 percent of the geographic market
extension mergers, and 2 percent of the product extension mergers. During
the 16 year period, no mergers in the "other" category were brought into
court.
44
This activity affected the character of the merger movement and
deflected its course somewhat, but it has not arrested its vitality or undone
much of what has taken place. Businessmen turned away from horizontal
mergers involving large firms. Mergers were curtailed sharply in several
industries which, due to intense merger activity, attracted a good deal of
enforcement action: steel, cement, shoes, dairy and food retailing.45 The
regulated industries which thought themselves exempt, in whole or in part,
from the antitrust laws were given reason to abandon that conclusion. 4 And
predictably, '"pure" conglomerates, those in the "other" category, accelerated
in number and size. a
Let us examine briefly some of the conglomerate situations which have
been before the Supreme Court. The case law has developed some helpful
guidelines in cases involving product extension and market extension
situations. In a sense, they have been carved out of the conglomerate merger
class. 47
1. Product Extension
In Clorox, 48 Procter & Gamble (P&G) was charged with a violation of
section 7 of the Clayton Act for acquiring Clorox Chemical Company, the
43 H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
44 MUELLER, THE CELLER-KEFAUVER ACT: 16 YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT, supra note 34,
at 7-8.
451d. at 14-26.
46 See California v. Federal Power Comm. (FPC), 369 U.S. 482 (1962); United States
v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
47 The Supreme Court declined to classify the product extension merger in Clorox
as a conglomerate merger. The "other conglomerate" merger category might eventually
be dismantled in a similar manner as the anticompetitive effects of such mergers are
better understood.
48 FTC v, Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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leading manufacturer in the heavily concentrated household liquid bleach
industry. P & G was diversifying into product lines related to its basic
detergent-soap-cleanser business. At the time of acquisition P & G was not
in the liquid bleach business, but it was the most likely entrant. The liquid
bleach industry was already oligopolistic before the acquisition. Price
competition was not as vigorous as it would have been were the industry
competitive. The merger was anticompetitive, the Court held, because
(1) the substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller, but
already dominant, firm may substantially reduce the competitive
structure of the industry by raising entry barriers and by dissuading
the smaller firms from aggressively competing;
(2) the acquisition eliminates the potential competition of the acquiring
firm.4 9 P & G's existence on the edge of the industry exerted con-
siderable influence on the market, a competitive influence extin-
guished by its acquisition of the principal firm in the industry.
The merger was also in violation of section 7 because it conferred on
Clorox, the dominant firm in its industry, marketing and promotional
competitive advantages. 50
2. Market Extension
The United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.51 case provides an
example of a merger handled as a market extension type. Pacific Northwest
Pipeline Corporation tried without success in the mid-1950's to market
Canadian natural gas supplies by pipeline in California. At the time, El Paso
Natural Gas Company alone served that market with pipeline supplies of
natural gas from out-of-state sources. El Paso's acquisition of the shares of
Pacific Northwest and the subsequent merger of the two companies with the
approval of the Federal Power Commission in 1957 were held to violate
section 7 of the Clayton Act, even though Pacific Northwest lacked the
financial and physicial ability to build a competitive pipeline to serve the
California market. What mattered was that Pacific Northwest, a potential
competitor, had been extinguished by the merger.
Whether one considers these and similar decisions as involving situations
which are not truly conglomerate mergers, they do lay bare to the measure
of prior judicial decision a large number of conglomerate mergers. Most
large firms are the product of many mergers. When they are engaged in a
broad variety of activities, any new acquisition must run the gauntlet of the
principles enunciated in Clorox and El Paso. Some acquiring firms seem to
court this risk, counting on saving the bulk of the acquisition by a later
49 Id. at 578.
50 See also General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963);
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
51 376 U.S. 651 (1964). El Paso involved a regulated industry. See also California v.
FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
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settlement with the antitrust authorities under which they will divest
themselves of the activity or activities which involve the most obvious con-
traventions of the Clayton Act. The possibility of this remedy removes in
large measure the deterrent effect of section 7. On that account it ought to be
indulged so rarely as to make the hope of such relief speculative.
3. Reciprocity
Once one gets beyond the pale of product extension and market
extension mergers and situations where the acquired firm obtains a competi-
tive advantage from economies of advertising and the like, and enters into
the "other conglomerate" or "pure" conglomerate picture, there are fewer
landmarks. One of the most vital involves reciprocal dealing which can
serve to increase concentration in an industry. Firm A which is a major
market for firm B's product is in a position to insist as a quid pro quo for
continued purchases that B acquire its needs (of products which firm A
produces) from A. This practice, with its obvious anticompetitive conse-
quences, has served as the basis for challenging conglomerate acquisitions
which adversely affect the balance of competitive power in an industry.52
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.58 involved the acquisition of Gentry,
Inc., manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic, by Consolidated, which
owned food processing plants and wholesale and retail stores. Suppliers of
processed foods to Consolidated were thereafter expected to purchase their
requirements of dehydrated onions and garlic from Consolidated's new
subsidiary. The Court held:
The "reciprocity" made possible by such an acquisition is one of the
congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws are
aimed .... A threatened withdrawal of orders if products of an affiliate
cease being bought, as well as a conditioning of future purchases on the
receipt of orders for products of that affiliate, is an anticompetitive
practice. 54
The Court observed that although Gentry's products were inferior, it was
able to increase its 35 percent share of the onion market after the merger and
to limit the decrease in its share of the garlic market. The Court went on
to advise that it was not holding that all mergers, no matter how small, would
violate section 7 if there is a probability of reciprocal buying. "But where,
as here, the acquisition is of a company that commands a substantial share
of a market, a finding of probability of reciprocal buying by the Commission,
whose expertise the Congress trusts, should be honored, if there is substantial
evidence to support it."'55
The assumption that reciprocity is a serious economic threat to competi-
52 See also Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263
(D. Del.), rev'd, 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1970).
53 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
54 Id. at 594.
55 Id. at 600.
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
tion has been challenged. The President's Task Force on Productivity and
Competition argued that the threat is "either small or nonexistent: monop-
oly power in one commodity is not effectively exploited by manipulating
the price of an unrelated commodity. The argument advanced against the
simplistic treatment of vertical mergers- essentially that one cannot use
the same monopoly power twice - also challenges the fears of reciprocity."56
However, it is not very persuasive when it is observed that businessmen saw
sufficient economic virtue in the practice to organize special departments to
exploit every opportunity for its employment.5 7 But that was before Con-
solidated Foods was decided.
Can an acquiring firm ward off a section 7 complaint based on a show-
ing that a merger will create a market structure conducive to reciprocal
dealing with the defense that it has neither an organized reciprocity pro-
gram nor a prior history of reciprocal dealings with its suppliers, has a
written policy against reciprocity, and operates under a "profit center" form
of organization which is not conducive to reciprocity? The district court, in
denying the Government a preliminary injunction against ITT's take-over
of Grinnell Corp., indicated that such a question might be answered in the
affirmative because it is not "probable" that reciprocal dealing will occur,
and section 7 of the Clayton Act deals with probabilities, not possibilities.58
This is a conclusion difficult to accept. Confronted with the creation by
merger agreement of a power to injure competition, the Court would leave
it to the acquiring firm's self-restraint to avoid an actual injury to competi-
tion. Congress intended no such result. The power of reciprocal dealing is
a power to exclude. Any merger agreement which will enable a firm to ac-
quire that power and creates a tendency toward monopoly. Although di-
rected to a quite different factual situation, it is rather appropriate here to
quote one of Judge Learned Hand's statements in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America (Alcoa):59
Only in case we interpret "exclusion" as limited to maneuvers not honestly
industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition, can such
a course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not "exclusionary." So to limit
it would in our judgment emasculate the Act; would permit just such
consolidations as it was designed to prevent.
Monopoly powers need not be exercised in order to be unlawful under
section 2 of the Sherman Act. It is sufficient that there exists power to exclude
56 STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT at 6476.
57 See Address by R. W. McLaren, Northwestern University Law School, Oct. 8,
1969, reprinted as McLaren, Looking Ahead in Antitrust, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,258,
at 55,542. (1969).
58 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
59 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945),
quoted with approval in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 814
(1946).
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actual or potential competition and the purpose to exercise that power.60
Achievement of the power by agreement may be sufficient to demonstrate
the necessary purpose. "[N]o monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what
he is doing."61 Congress intended that the Government's burden of proof
when enforcing section 7 of the Clayton Act against incipient monopolies
be less than that required in Sherman Act cases. A merger is effected by
agreement, and this should be sufficient to provide the intent or purpose to
bring into being whatever potential there is in the situation to practice
reciprocity, Promised self-restraint should never be permitted to legitimize
a power position thus deliberately and collusively created. There is "cer-
tainly no requirement that the anticompetitive power manifest itself in
anticompetitive action before section 7 can be called into play. If the
enforcement of section 7 turned on the existence of actual anticompetitive
practices, the congressional policy of thwarting such practices in their
incipiency would be frustrated." 62
GRAPPLING WITH THE PURE CONGLOMERATE MERGER
Judge Weinfeld listed the major objectives of the 1950 amendment of
section 7 of the Clayton Act, based on his reading of the Senate and House
Committee Reports, in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.:63
(1) to limit future increases in the level of economic concentration re-
sulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions;
(2) to meet the threat posed by the merger movement to small business
fields and thereby aid in preserving small business as an important com-
petitive factor in the American economy;
(3) to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and before
they attain Sherman Act proportions; and
(4) to avoid a Sherman Act test in deciding the effects of a merger.6 4
Other objectives could be listed,65 but the above should serve to focus a
discussion of the applicability of section 7 to "other conglomerate" or "pure"
conglomerate mergers.66
60 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
61 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
62 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 577.
63 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The case involved an attempted merger of Bethle-
hem Steel (assets of $2,195 million) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company (assets of
$660 million). The effect was primarily horizontal, although it had vertical aspects as well.
64 Id. at 583.
65 The Supreme Court listed seven factors discussed by Congress considered relevant
to a judgment on the legality of a particular merger in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 US. 294 (1962).
66 "That § 7 was intended to apply to all mergers- horizontal, vertical or con-
glomerate- was specifically reiterated by the House Report on the final bill." Id. at
317 n.31.
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A. Increase in the Level of Economic Concentration
There has been no general tendency for market concentration 67 to
increase since World War 11.68 Although the Cabinet Committee Staff
indicated that the existing concentration levels in many industries may be
greater than necessary to achieve economies of scale in production, research
and innovation, it appears that market concentration has declined in
producer goods industries over the postwar years.69 This has been credited
in large measure to the government's success in dissuading or dissolving
large horizontal mergers since the Celler-Kefauver Act became law in 1950.
However, it is contended that market concentration has increased "sharply
and persistently" in consumer goods industries in recent years.
Aggregate concentration, which measures the concentration of all
manufacturing assets or sales, increased more sharply in 1967 than it did in
any year in modern industrial history, and 1968 exceeded 1967. One of the
consequences of this is that the hundred largest corporations held the same
share of manufacturing assets by 1967 that the 200 largest corporations held
in 1948.70 This condition indicates that the purpose of the 1950 act "to limit
future increases in the level of economic concentration resulting from
corporate mergers and acquisitions" 71 has not been fulfilled.
The Department of Justice had trouble facing up to these facts. The
Department's 1968 Merger Guidelines72 indicated concern about changes in
market structure occasioned by conglomerate mergers, but not about ag-
gregate concentration: "Within the over-all scheme of the Department's
antitrust enforcement activity, the primary role of section 7 enforcement is
to preserve and promote market structures conducive to competition."75 Two
categories of conglomerate mergers were regarded as having sufficiently
identifiable anticompetitive effects to be the subject of guidelines: mergers
involving potential entrants and mergers creating a danger of reciprocal
buying.7 4
In June 1969, with a change of administration and new leadership, the
Department developed other enforcement policies. Summarizing these
policies in a speech to the bar in Savannah, Georgia,75 the Attorney General
67 This term refers to the share of business held by the leading firms in the indus-
try. It is measured by sales concentration in the manufacturer of a particular product.
68 See CABINET STUDY at 81. The data in this study cover the period 1947-1966.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 82. These data and, consequently, the references drawn from them, have
been challenged. See Rose, Bigness Is A Numbers Game, FORTUNE, Nov. 1969, at 113.
71 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
72 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 1 TRADE REG. REP. 4430, at 6681
(1968).
78 Id.
74 Id. at 6687-88.
75 Address by Att'y Gen. Mitchell, Georgia Bar Ass'n, Savannah, Ga., June 6, 1969,
reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,247, at 55,505 (1969).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
observed that conglomerate mergers do not necessarily increase efficiency
and profits, that corporate bigness does not necessarily stimulate the most
imaginative scientific research,7 6 and that the large firm is not better able
to market goods. After enumerating some of the competitive dangers to be
expected of conglomerate mergers, Mr. Mitchell stated:
The Department of Justice may very well oppose any merger among
the top 200 manufacturing firms or firms of comparable size in other
industries.
The Department of Justice will probably oppose any merger by one
of the top 200 manufacturing firms of any leading producer in any con-
centrated industry.
And, of course, the Department will continue to challenge mergers
which may substantially lessen potential competition or develop a sub-
stantial potential for reciprocity.7?
The Attorney General did not say bigness is bad, but he certainly implied
that it has few redeeming virtues today.
The first plank of the new policy enumerated above is based on the
premise that Congress intended to stem the tide of aggregate concentration.
In an effort to obtain recognition of this purpose by the courts, the Attorney
General has brought suit to dissolve several mergers between large firms,
e.g., the acquisition by International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation
(assets of $4 billion) of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company (assets of $1.8
billion) and Grinnel Corporation (assets of $184 million); the acquisition by
Ling-Temco-Vought of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (assets of $1
billion); and the attempted acquisition by Northwest Industries, Inc. (assets
of $1.3 billion) of the B. F. Goodrich Company (assets of about $1 billion).78
The Government has been unsuccessful in its efforts to enjoin these super-
conglomerate mergers pending completion of the antitrust suits. The district
court judges have not been convinced that the Government's opposition to
very large conglomerate mergers on the basis of a congressional purpose
to stem the tide of concentration will be successful. The district court in
United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc.79 declined to read section 7 as
holding that "given a trend to economic concentration, the consolidation of
two of the country's one hundred largest corporations constitutes a violation
of section 7 without any specific demonstration of a substantial lessening of
competition in any section of the country."80 However, the court did require
the two corporations be maintained as separate functional entities pendente
lite. Similarly, in United States v. International Telephone and Telegraph
76 For similar views, see CABINET STUDY at 67.
77 Address by Att'y Gen. Mitchell, supra note 75, at 55,509.
78 The logic and law behind this enforcement activity is set forth in an address by
R. W. Donnem before the American Management Ass'n Briefing Session, New York City,
Nov. 10, 1969, reprinted as Donnem, Antitrust and the Super-Conglomerates, 5 TRADE
REr. REP. 52,263, (1969).
79301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
80 Id. at 1096.
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Corp.,81 the court held that it would require further legislation before courts
could block a merger solely on the grounds of increased concentration.8 2
I think it clear that Congress intended that the Celler-Kefauver Act
serve to retard aggregate concentration in the economy. The Senate Report
urging enactment of the legislation states: "The purpose of the proposed
bill ... is to limit future increases in the level of economic concentration
resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions."8 3 The question, essen-
tially, is whether the Supreme Court will recognize that an admitted increase
in aggregate concentration resulting from the conglomerate merger of two
very large corporations is an acquisition the effect of which "in any line of
commerce in any section of the country" may be "substantially to lessen
competition ... or to tend to create a monopoly."84 The Court could do
this by placing the burden of rebutting the inference on the defendants -
which would no doubt result in the Court being swamped with great
volumes of data and conflicting opinions of experts interpreting them - or
it could establish what amounts to a per se rule. In view of the limited
law-enforcement resources of the federal government, the desirability for
an early redress of aggregations already consummated, and the greater deter-
rent effect of an easily understood rule, the per se course is to be preferred.
Although the Department of Justice is moving belatedly, its present activities
now leave it to the courts to determine whether the antitrust laws will once
again be found wanting at a critical time in a major merger movement.
The conglomerates do have their advocates.8 5 Conglomerate merger
activities are justified on various grounds, such as; improvement in efficiency,
productivity and management; the revitalizing of industry; a freer, more
flexible and competitive economy.s But conglomerate mergers are certainly
not self-justifying, some commentators having made a case for viewing their
activities with concern. The Cabinet Staff Committee study concluded that
the merger movement "appears to be propelled by special financial and
81306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
82 Id. at 781.
8S. REP. No. 1775, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950). See also H. R. REP. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949).
84 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
85 "As for conglomerate mergers, public policy ought to welcome them. The trend to
conglomerates allows corporate capital or managerial skill to be applied in new markets
that might otherwise languish for lack of these ingredients." Ways, Antitrust In An Era
Of Radical Change, FORTUNE, March 1966, at 128, 225.
88 Professor Corwin Edwards has stated the advantages which arise from the con-
glomerate's financial resources more pungently:
In encounters with small enterprises it can buy scarce materials and at-
tractive sites, inventions, and facilities; preempt the services of the most expensive
technicians and executives; and acquire reserves of materials for the future. It
can absorb losses that would consume the entire capital of a smaller rival ...
moment by moment the big company can outbid, outspend, or outlose the
small one; and from a series of such monetary advantages it derives an advan-
tage in attaining its large aggregate results.
Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND
PRICE POLICY 334-35 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research ed. 1955).
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speculative considerations rather than by the pursuit of efficiency through
large scale business organization. Hence, public policy toward the current
merger movement, more than any other factor, will determine the future
of competition in the American economy."8 7 This view is consistent with a
trenchant observation recently made in a Fortune article: "The fact remains,
however, that the process of putting conglomerates together tends to expand
stock prices long before it expands the economic values on which stock
prices ultimately depend. Moreover, this tendency, thanks to the efforts of
latter-day empire builders, is becoming steadily more pronounced."8 8
Where is the line to be drawn on mergers opposed on grounds of con-
centration? The "200 largest firms" category announced by the Attorney
General appears sensible. The classification is already in existence, although
up to now perhaps more a source of pride and frustration rather than appre-
hension. Each company in the group is of a great size, and each has had a
history of merger activities. Mergers between them could not be regarded
as being of little consequence to the economy. With only limited resources,
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission could readily
police the activities of such a small group. Experience shows that business-
men turn away from certain anticompetitive activities when they become
convinced that they breed antitrust suits. And although this policy might
lead firms which are not on the 200 list to become more active acquirers,
these firms could be pursued on an ad hoc basis when they offend other
merger standards developed by the courts.
Another approach may be in order. The Government might analyze
the behavior of each of the 25 largest conglomerates 9 to determine whether
experience shows that assets acquired by such firms have been so managed
in the past that competition has suffered substantially. Where in the usual
case such evidence might warrant dissolution only of the particular merger
under scrutiny, it could serve as the basis for a continuing injunction against
any further acquisition by the large conglomerate until the court is per-
suaded that there has been a change in the controlling management
(including the board of directors) which promises a pro-competitive policy
in the future. The courts should not hesitate in adopting a stringent position
when it is apparent from a large conglomerate's record that acquisitions have
been made principally for speculative purposes and at the expense of
developing the acquired assets as part of a viable, effectively managed,
competitive business.
B. The Threat to Small Business
Congress intended, in enacting the Celler-Kefauver Act, to foster an
environment in which small businesses could operate effectively: "The en-
87 CABINET STUDY at 83.
88 Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTuNE, Feb. 1969, at 79, 80.
89 Each of the 25 ranked in 1968 among Fortune's largest industrial companies. FTC
REPoRT at Table 5-2.
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actment of the bill will limit further growth of monopoly and thereby aid
in preserving small business as an important competitive factor in the Amer-
ican economy." 90 Speaking of the earlier legislation, Judge Learned Hand
observed in Alcoa that: "Throughout the history of these [antitrust] stat-
utes it has been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to per,
petuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an orga-
nization of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other."91
Much has been said about the virtues of small businesses and the con-
tribution they make to competition, invention, innovation and initiative
in a free enterprise economy. Yet, congressional efforts to aid small business
have sometimes had an anticompetitive side. The price discrimination pro-
visions of the Robinson-Patman Act amending section 2 of the Clayton Act
have been criticized on this account. But Congress has recognized that com-
petition might be stimulated by mergers of small firms.
When concern as to the Act's breadth was expressed, supporters of the
amendments indicated that it would not impede, for example, a merger
between two small companies to enable the combination to compete more
effectively with larger corporations dominating the relevant market, nor a
merger between a corporation which is financially healthy and a failing
one which no longer can be a vital competitive factor in the market.92
Where a small business, because of size, operates a plant which does
not enjoy economies of scale, a merger which would provide the capital
or other means requisite to overcome the deficiency might well improve
competition. But a pure conglomerate merger might not serve to promote
economic efficiency or to overcome the most obvious competitive weaknesses
of the acquired small business.
It seems apparent that the changes in industrial structure being effected
by the conglomerate mergers affect small business in at least two ways. A
particular small business might be acquired as a mode of entry into an in-
dustry in which the acquiring firm is not already active. Or the small firm
may find itself competing, to its disadvantage, with a large conglomerate
which has acquired one of the other firms in the industry. Where the two
firms involved are small, a pure conglomerate merger would probably have
no obvious anticompetitive effects.
Without interference, several large conglomerates could acquire all of
the firms in a given industry without increasing market concentration.9 3
90S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
91 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
"Small business" has never been defined either in the Sherman or Clayton Acts or in the
legislative history; it is a relative term, depending for content on the industry under
study.
92Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
93 "In fact, during the course of the current merger movement, much of the capacity
of entire industries has been absorbed by large conglomerate enterprises." Hearings on
the Status and Future of Small Business in the American Economy before the Senate
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In the process, every small business would be eliminated, each being super-
seded by a giant enterprise. An oligopoly would be created and the intent
of Congress frustrated. New rules of noncompetition could come into play:
forebearance, reciprocity, competition on nonessentials rather than on price
and quality, emphasis on new legislation to protect market positions, and
industry-wide labor negotiations.
At what point can and should the Government act to preserve small
business in this evolving situation? Should it delay, avoiding a challenge to
conglomerate activities until study and discussion conferences obtain the
full measure of the problem? The White House Task Force on Productivity
and Competition would apply the brakes of discretion to any active pro-
gram challenging conglomerate mergers until the fears about the size and
economic power of conglomerates are either "confirmed or dissipated."9 4
The latter objective is to be obtained by "an early conference on the sub-
ject." 95 Were this course to be followed, many small businesses might cease
to exist as vital competitive forces in many sectors of the economy before
relief was available, a condition not easily redressed through exercise of
the remedial powers of the courts.
The June 1969 policy statement of the Attorney General placed no
emphasis on enforcement of the Clayton Act with the objective of preserving
small business. Reference was made to mergers between large firms, and to
the acquisition by a large firm of a leading producer (which may or may
not be small) in a concentrated industry. What the Government might also
do, for test case purposes, as a part of its program against conglomerates,
is to oppose several conglomerate mergers by some of the 200 largest firms
where the acquired firm is small, and where there is a history of disappearing
small businesses in the industry.96 The Government would then be con-
fronting the question whether the presence of small businesses as effective
participants in a competitive economy is an objective Congress intended in
amending section 7 in 1950 - a purpose of sufficient value to society to
warrant a major interference by the Government with the acquisition efforts
of the largest firms.
This approach would not eliminate the acquisition of small businesses;
it would simply reduce the number of large firms combing the market for
such acquisitions. And it might well retard the demise of small businesses.9 7
Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 447, 448 (1967) (statement of Dr.
Willard F. Mueller).
94 STIGLER TASK FOacE REPORT at 6476.
95 Id.
96 "But remaining vigor cannot immunize a merger if the trend in that industry is
toward oligopoly." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 333.
97 "Congress sought to preserve competition among many small businesses by arrest-
ing a trend toward concentration in its incipiency before that trend developed to the
point that a market was left in the grip of a few big companies." United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966).
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
C. Incipient Monopolization
The large resources of certain participants in some industries may, in
effect, provide them with a share of the market from which they may effec-
tively exclude all others. To that extent, they enjoy a monopoly. There is
a possibility that this condition will become prevalent if the acquisition of
small and medium sized firms in oligopolistic situations by large conglom-
erates is allowed free rein. This is one area of the antitrust law which needs
development, and where the economists can be of great assistance to the
courts.
It seems apparent that a firm can enjoy an unlawful monopoly when
controlling less than the share of the market that Alcoa had.98 In United
States v. Lehigh Valley Railroad,99 the Supreme Court found monopoliza-
tion where a railroad controlling anthracite coal properties transported in
excess of one-fifth of the entire annual production of anthracite in the
country. Under some circumstances, it is possible that an even lower per-
centage of control could violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The burden of proof which the Government must meet in a section 7
case is certainly less stringent than that required in a Sherman Act case;
the Government need only establish a reasonable probability that the merger
will tend to create a monopoly. Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended,
said Judge Weinfeld in Bethlehem Steel Co., "to cope with monopolistic ten-
dencies in their incipiency and before they attain Sherman Act propor-
tions." 00
"Monopoly," as used in section 7, means "monopoly power" - the
power to exclude or the power to control prices. Any pure conglomerate
merger might prove, because of intervening developments, to be in viola-
tion of the Clayton Act when its legality is challenged years after the event.
But then, since section 7 is applicable "at any time when a threat of the
prohibited effects is evident,"'' 1 the merger will be tested in light of con-
ditions at the time suit is brought. That such an ultimate determination
might take place would probably be quite speculative at the time two small
firms merge, when they have no apparent power to exclude or to fix prices.
But the case may be quite different where the acquiring firm is a large con-
glomerate.
While it may offend all rules of economics and good management,102
a large conglomerate can continue to operate an acquired division that is
98 Ninety percent of supply "is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful
whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent
is not." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 424.
99 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
100 168 F. Supp. 576, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (emphasis supplied).
101 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 598 (1957).
102 "Economic performance .. . is the specific function and contribution of business
enterprise, and the reason for its existence." P. DRUCKER, MANAGING FOR RESULTS ix (1964).
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not earning an adequate profit, possibly for a long period of time. It might
do this for one of many reasons, including prestige, tax benefits, managerial
pride (or embarrassment), expectation of a turn-about in the future, a desire
to retrieve the capital invested in the venture, or currying favor with public
authorities. But regardless of the reason, the large firm has resources to con-
tinue a manufacturing or mining venture which is not fully profitable long
after the small firm, operating under similar circumstances, would collapse.
And that potential situation is created every time a large conglomerate ac-
quires a small firm. If managerial acumen is the real contribution large
conglomerates make in acquiring smaller firms under pure conglomerate
circumstances, as has been suggested, such dislocating practices ought not
occur. The practical difficulty is that management does not always measure
up to public assurances and, where it does, there can be no assurance suc-
cessors in office will be as competent.
Not very much appears to be known about the competitive virtues of
pure conglomerates. The extent to which they promote economic efficiency
is questioned. x08 They can and should be challenged as incipient monop-
olies where the acquiring firm is either one of the 200 largest manufactur-
ing firms in the United States, or a firm of comparable size in another
industry.
D. Avoidance of the Sherman Act Test
The Government could wait until it determines how the conglomerate
merger movement will affect competition and the economy, and then, in
the light of that certitude, seek ameliorating remedies. However, such a
course of inaction would represent a rejection of the fourth purpose of the
1950 amendment - avoidance of the Sherman Act proof of actual restraint
of trade. "A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to competition
is incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reach-
ing incipient restraints."'104 Were the Government, as a matter of policy,
to wait until an unreasonable restraint of trade arose or a monopolization
occurred before challenging a merger, section 7 of the Clayton Act would
be abandoned in favor of the ineffectual Sherman Act.
This is the result approved by Fortune, although the editors of the
publication recognize that legislation is necessary which would make clear
"that mergers - horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate - are entirely legal
unless they spring from a manifest attempt to restrain trade."'105 Given the
low state of knowledge of the competitive consequences of particular con-
glomerate mergers and of the current merger movement as a whole, as well
as the limited resource of the Government to monitor and regulate devel-
opments by suit after the fact, this advice represents, it seems to me, a
103 See Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEO. L.J. 672,
679 (1958).
104 S. RaP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950).
105 FORTUNE, March 1966, at 129.
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confidence in the self-restraint of businessmen which has not proved war-
ranted at any time in modern history.
There is an understandable fear in leaving to the courts the power to
forestall attractive merger arrangements. Judges lack "expertise." They are
not economists. They are not businessmen. They lack real insight into the
problems of an industry. One might assume that each of these charges is
true and recognize, nonetheless, that it is the business of the courts, in crim-
inal and in civil matters, to act on the basis of probabilities.
The role of determining when an agreement (in this case a merger)
violates the law regulating restraints of trade and monopolization has been
a function of the courts for at least four centuries. While often criticized,
their record in this regard has been sufficiently sound to warrant Congress
giving them the last word, even in most cases of regulated industries claiming
exemption for anticompetitive activities under a statute or decision of an
expert regulatory body. No other group has yet been found in our society to
play the part better; and none appears on the horizon.
CONCLUSION
Businessmen have been acting vigorously in effecting conglomerate
mergers despite a lack of clarity as to the competitive consequences of their
actions and an absence of certainty as to their legality. A significant accu-
mulation of power over the economy in the hands of a few corporations is
taking place at an accelerating rate. Some would like to see the Government
match this vigor with timidity. Public policy, so it is said, must move slowly
in prohibiting or restricting acquisition activities by conglomerates, 10 6 par-
ticularly where pure conglomerates are involved.'0 7 Not enough is known of
the relationship between their acquisitions, and monopoly, oligopoly and
competition to warrant regulation - a condition aided by bookkeeping
practices such as "pooling of interests" and blending of operating results
which make it impossible for an outsider to know which activities of the
conglomerate may be underwriting inadequate returns on others. However,
these arguments assume that economists and legislators, given time and the
requisite data, can supply answers which will provide meaningful guides
to antitrust enforcement policies in conglomerate situations which we do
not have today. Apart from the reality that no human discipline has yet
mastered the forecasting of future events with any assurance of accuracy,
there is reason to believe that the problems created by conglomerates may
simply be too complex for that sort of analysis, certitude and recommenda-
tion.
In the present state of the science, economic analysis cannot handle more
than a small fraction of all the variables and contingencies needed for a
106 STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT at 6476; see Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285,
362 (1967).
107 Turner, supra note 8.
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sound legal judgment on changing market structure in any particular
"monopoly" case. And the analysis tends to ignore the element around
which competition in fact increasingly centers- managerial brains. 08
In this state of limited knowledge, the courts have a choice. Despairing
of exact knowledge, they might reject the use of "educated" guesses of
economists and others as to the probable consequences of conglomerate
mergers, and allow the Clayton Act to become a mute and ineffectual spec-
tator of a massive shift in economic power in our society. Should things
go wrong, Congress would then be cast in the role of a "heavy", blamed for
not enacting laws capable of dealing with the situation as it developed. Or,
the courts could continue to apply section 7 of the Clayton Act with the
vigor which has been shown by the Supreme Court over the past decade,
preventing mergers where the "probabilities" indicate an aggravation of a
condition Congress sought to ameliorate, or a contradiction of a purpose
the law was intended to promote. The latter course appears warranted by
the legislative history of the 1950 amendment of section 7 and by recent
developments in the merger movement, even though law-enforcement in
the absence of exact economic knowledge may be dubbed with the pejora-
tive label "political."
108 Ways, supra note 85, at 221.
